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ABSTRACT
This is a preliminary report on technology transfer, with
data to be taken eventually from a stratified, random sample of
300 Irish manufacturing firms. The present study reports data
from the first 75 of these firms.
New technology, in these instances, reached the firm almost
entirely through direct personal contact, most often with people in
the same industry, but outside Ireland. Little use is made of the
scientific/technological infra-structure of the country in accomplishing
this transfer.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Spring of 1971, an extensive study of technology transfer in
the Republic of Ireland was begun. In the first phase of this study, a
survey was made of communication patterns among all engineers and scientists
working in research and development. From this survey analyses have been
made of the flow of scientific and technological information communication
structure at both the individual and institutional levels (Allen, et.al.,
1972; Allen & Cooney, 1973; Herzog, 1975). From these analyses much has
been learned of how those who are themselves responsible for advancing tech-
nology, learn of new technological developments. Such analyses should
provide interesting and useful results for the research and development com-
munity in Ireland. Still it must be remembered that the vast majority of
Irish industrial firms do not undertake any research and development, at all,
and were therefore excluded from the communication survey.
To fill this gap, a second phase of the overall study, was begun in
the Summer of 1972. For this phase a stratified sample of manufacturing
firms was selected from industrial census statistics, to be representative
of Irish industry.
Characteristics of the Firms that Were Studied
The total sample includes 300 firms in 26 industries. Industries were
excluded from analysis for any of the following reasons:
1) If industry gross output were less than £7.5 million in 1968, or
if employment was less than 1,500 in 1968, unless it has important
exports or known technological innovation problems.
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Mr. Breffni Tomlin of the Depart-
ment of Business University College Dublin, for specifying the criteria for
industry selection, and for performing the actual mechanics of sample selection.
2) If the industry predominantly served the domestic market and
had a low growth in volume of output since 1953.
3) If the study methodology were judged to be inappropriate for the
industry, this could result from either of the following two
situations
.
a) More than two-thirds of the industry output is attributable
to a few large producers (these industries will be studied
separately)
.
b) Industries with minimal processing, mostly not on a factory
model, or with production tasks determined elsewhere.
During the summers, of 1972, 1974, 1975 and 1976, 81 firms in 12 indus-
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tries were approached and asked to cooperate m the study. From this ini-
tial sample, there were two outright refusals, and four firms disqualified
themselves because they were no longer involved in manufacturing. The firms
were distributed among 12 industries (Table 1) and are representative only
of those 12 industries. One must be cautious in generalizing the findings
to all of Irish industry, but in many respects the results have stabilized
and the author would be very surprised if any major changes result from the
addition of the remaining lA industries.
The 75 firms are most small in size, with but five in excess of 250
employees (Table 11). This bias was introduced purposely for two reasons.
First it is representative of Irish industry, generally. And second, we
are particularly concerned with the problems of bringing new technology to
the smaller firm where the problem of capturing new technology is particularly
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acute. Firms with fewer than 50 employees were excluded, at this point,
but will be brought in later to see whether any significant differences exist.
2 . ...
One firm is double-counted, since it appeared in the sample twice, represent-
ing two industries.
3 . . . .
One of the firms in the sample had only 33 employees at the time of the inter-
view. It had more than 50 employees at the time that the census data were
obtained upon wliich the sample w;is based.
RESEARCH METHOD
The method used to determine the sources of new technology was very
simple and straightforward. The general manager (or his designate), in
each firm, was asked to think back over the last several years and then
tell us what he thought was the most significant change, in either product
or process, that had occurred within the firm. The principals who were
involved in introducing the change were then interviewed at length to learn
as much as possible about the circumstances surrounding the introduction
of the new technology.
Now this approach necessarily introduces a bias in the data, which
the reader should bear in mind when evaluating the results. The bias is
toward those changes in product or process, which are viewed by the manage-
ment of the firm as being relatively significant. It is entirely possible
that there are many minor changes, involving the introduction of new tech-
nology, and if these were studied it might be found that entirely different
sources provided this lower level technology. Those sources which appear to
be high contributors in the present study might be poor contributors of
this more mundane technology, while those appearing here to be low contri-
butors might be very important in introducing minor changes to the firm.
There is no way of knowing from the present data whether this possibility
has basis in fact. However, it must be said that the major proportion of
the technological change uncovered in the present study was far from being
overly sophisticated or path-breaking in any sense. True, there are a
couple of instances of truly innovative' active, but most of the changes
are of the minor "bread and butter" sort that may keep a firm competitive
but hardly upset an industry.
TABLE I
Industries From Wliich Firms Were Sampled
industry description
(as used by Central
Statistics Office)
description to be used
in remainder of this report
Creamery butter, cheese, condensed milk,
ice cream, etc.
Bacon factories
Slaughtering, perservation and processing
of meat (other than by bacon factories)
Canning of fruit and vegatables and
manufacturing of preserves, jams,
jellies, etc.
Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and
sugar confectionery
Structural clay products, asbetos goods,
plaster, gypsum and concrete products,
slate and dressed stone
Manufacture of electrical machinery,
apparatus and appliances
Men's and boys' clothing
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Manufacture and assembly of
machinery
Paper and paper products
Linen and cotton spinning,
weaving and manufacture
milk products
bacon
other meat
canning
chocolate and
confectionery
building materials
electrical & electronics
men's and boys' clothing
chemicals and pharmaceuticals
machinery manufacture
paper
linen & cotton
TABLE II
Distribution of Firms by Industry and Size
industry
number of
Interviews with the principals were designed with two main goals in mind.
The sources which first brought the new idea to the attention of the firm
were sought first. These first sources are extremely critical in the case
of the smaller, less technically-oriented firms. Just being aware of the
possibility of improvement and the means to bring it about is the major
share of the battle. So the question of making the firm aware of the po-
tential for new technology becomes an extremely important one. Once it
became clear just how all of the information was obtained concerning the
new technology and its potential, and the decision was made to introduce
it to the firm, then further data were sought regarding any problems that
might have been encountered in the course of its introduction. Seldom does
any form of change occur without problems of some sort. The interview
sought to determine what these were and how they were solved. Naturally,
what we were looking for was any form of aid from sources external to the
firm. Such "technical problem solving" is an extremely important service,
which might be provided by outside agencies of many sorts ranging from equip-
ment suppliers to private consultants. These may or may not be the same
agencies responsible for the original idea, and they certainly play an im-
portant and somewhat independent role.
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After learning as much as possible about the firm's "innovation",
the interview went on to gather background data from the principals regarding
their previous work experience, general use of information sources, and
their degree of contact outside of the country.
The term innovation will be used in this report in a very limited sense. It
is taken to mean something new to a particular firm. Even if every other firm
in the industry is already using it, if it is new to the firm under consideration
it will be called an "innovation".
The case histories compiled during the interviews were each analyzed to
determine a number of things. Key among these were the sources of the original
information about the innovation. The unit of analysis used was the "message"
(Menzel, 1958; Allen, 1966). Each time a respondent indicated that he had learned
something additional about the innovation, that instance was considered a "message"
and its source was recorded. Previous research (Allen, 1966; 1977) has demon-
strated very clearly the obvious fact that new ideas seldom appear full-blown
from a single source of information. Bits and pieces of what eventually becomes
a new idea arrive from a variety of sources. These are what we will call
"messages".' The individuals, who introduce the new idea to the organization,
integrate these messages and in that way make their own creative contribution
to the process. What the analysis does is to disintegrate the idea and determine
the sources of its component parts. Much of what follows, therefore, will be
based on an analysis of the sources of the "messages" that brought information
that helped in the solving of a particular problem, encountered in introducing
the idea or technique.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES OF "INNOVATIONS "
The following examples are presented to illustrate the general nature
of the new technology and the kinds of information source from which it was
derived.
Tumble Processing of Hams
This is a process in which a number of hams are tumbled together in a
large rotating cylindrical container. Over the course of several hours,
by a process that is not fully understood, protein migrates to the surface
of the ham, thereby increasing the overall yield from a carcass by some
three to four percent.
The production manager in one Irish bacon factory first became aware
of this technique when he saw it being used in a Danish firm some twelve
years before. He put it down at that time as being something of considerable
interest but far too expensive for his scale of operations. Then, about two
years prior to the interview, he learned that a British manufacturer was
supplying the necessary equipment at a price that he could now afford. He
learned of this through suppliers' representatives, who visit the plant
occasionally. Once he expressed an interest, the supplier sent representa-
tives to conducts demonstration. The purchase was negotiated. Very few
problems were encountered with the process, and these few were solved by
the staff of the firm, with no need to seek outside help.
Ultra High Temperature Cream
The general manager of a large creamery was aware that long life milk,
capable of resisting spoilage for relatively long periods without refrigeration,
had been produced in Switzerland since about 1960. Since the export of cream
was a very attractive possibility, if some way could be found to prevent
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rapid spoilage, the possibility of producing a long life cream seemed at-
tractive. Inaddition, it was felt that there would be a good market in
Ireland, especially in the rural areas for long life cream and to the house-
wife it would be even more appealing than long life milk.
Further investigation revealed that the Swiss were using a steam in-
jection process and had originally packaged their milk in cans, but changed
over to foil-lined paper "tetra pack" containers in 1964 as a result of
the development in Sweden of an aseptic packaging process using this con-
tainer.
At this stage, a delegation was sent to Switzerland to scrutinize ultra-
high temperature milk processing. The firm then brought in a technical man
from Bord Bainne, built a facility to house the experimental operation and
obtained an ultra-high temperature milk processing plant, and an aseptic
tetra-pack packaging unit from Swedish suppliers. The problem was now to
convert all of this to the production of ultra-high temperature cream.
The Swedish suppliers were generally helpful in suggesting ways to adapt
their plant to the higher viscosity encountered in cream. The actual details
of the conversion had to be developed by a joint project team comprising
representatives from the firm. An Bord Bainne, An Foras Taluntais, and a
professor of agriculture engineering, from one of the universities.
A Turnable Modulation Mete r
Electronic modulation meters have always presented the technician with
an annoying problem. They require an almost endless process of balancing
various adjustments before a reading can be made. In one Irish firm, this
The Milk Marketing Bo.ird.
The Agriculture Research InstiLute
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problem was enough to stimulate an engineer to action. He decided to develop
a modulation meter that would be essentially self-tuning, and that would
perform the balancing process electronically over a broad frequency range-
All of his development was conducted within his own firm. The stimulus was
internal, and he never sought any assistance, other than provision of standard
components from outside his firm. The firm provided him with the necessary
time and resources to accomplish the development and were able to diversify
into an entirely new product line as a result.
Canning of Mushrooms
The manager of an Irish cannery, while visiting London, happened to
stay in the same hotel as a manager from the British subsidiary of a large
American food distributor. During the course of their stay, the two met,
engaged in a general conversation over the problems of the industry, and
eventually came onto the topic of canning and marketing mushrooms. The
man from the British firm reported back to his superiors that he knew of
a firm that was potentially capable of meeting the firm's need for an addi-
tional supplier. Shortly after that, the British firm approached the Irish
cannery on a formal basis with a proposal they would be willing to buy a
substantial quantity of canned mushrooms for marketing in the United
Kingdom. This was provided that the cannery could scale up their output
sufficiently, while maintaining quality standards. The cannery, as a result,
made an investment in new machinery and undertook a one year development
project. They were helped in this project by the British firm and by a
domestic machinery broker who advised on the type of machinery needed. They
also visited the Netherlands to see a mushroom cannery in operation and to
discuss the general problems of this process with a Dutch cannery. Some of
the necessary machines were purchased from the Dutch firm. A British can
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manufacturer was also very helpful. Representatives of that firm visited
the cannery, ostensibly to provide assistance with the process of seaming
the cans, in fact, they were extremely valuable in passing along other
information. From their experience in working with many canneries, they
had acquired considerable knowledge of the entire process and are able to
provide advice on the cooking, packing and wrapping operations, as well.
Process Simplif icaCion
One chemical firm had formerly purchased herbicide acids in powder form
from foreign suppliers. They then were required to mix the powder with an
appropriate solvent for the product was eventually employed in a liquid form.
The only reason for purchasing the material in powder form had been ease
of shipping. The acids are originally produced as liquid, and the manufac-
turer had to dry them into powder for shipping.
With the advent of liquid cargo containers that could be transferred
directly from ship to truck-bed, it became apparent to the general manager
of this firm that the drying stage could be dispensed with. He contacted
shippers and suppliers and negotiated to have his supplies shipped in liquid
form. This not only reduced his initial costs, it decreased inventory require-
ments, and allowed him to move his order date closer to the season, in which
farmers would need his product. This enabled him to make more accurate pre-
dictions of market requirements and reduced the probability that he would over
or understock the material.
RESULTS
Data were obtained on 73 Innovations. Two of the firms, one in the meat
packing industry, the other in the building materials industry were unable to
uncover any significant change, over the past 30 years, in their method of
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operation. In the former case, the firm's general manager gave more than the
usual amount of time to the interviewer, and was exceptionally helpful, but had
to confess that the firm was run in essentially the same way that it had been
under his grandfather's management. In the latter case, there is some reason
to suspect that the firm was merely attempting to avoid the bother of an inter-
view. What they claimed was that they had no significant change in either
product or process in over 30 years and that there was therefore no one available
who would be competent to discuss the last change.
Disregarding these two firms, the mean age of the remaining 73 innovations is
about three years. There is some difference across the ten industries (Table III),
but these should not be taken as measures of the degree of "innovativeness" of
the industries. As a matter of fact, two of the industries with the most complex
innovations (electrical and electronics and milk products) , are above the mean
in length of time between introduction of the innovation and our interview.
The age of the innovations is presented mainly to provide some idea of the
reliability of the data. Presumably, the data will be less reliable, the further
back in time that respondents had to recollect events.
Idea Sources
Sources for initial ideas were many and varied. More than 20 percent of the
messages came from within the firm (Table IV), indicating a reasonably high level
of innovativeness on the part of the firms, themselves. It is worth noting that
while there is a slight tendency for foreign-owned firms to generate more ideas
internally, that this difference is not significant statistically (Table V).
I'fhen a respondent cited one or more sources as contributing components of the
initial idea, each was credited w i ( ii having supplied a "message".
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Table III
industry mean time sinceintroduction of innovation
(years)
milk products
bacon
other meat
canning
chocolate, confectionery
building materials
electrical & electronics
men's and boys' clothing
chemicals and pharmaceuticals
machinery manufacture
cotton and linen textiles
paper
4.5
2.9
3.0
1.6
2.0
4.2
3.4
4.7
0.8
1.4
1.9
3.5
Table IV
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Sources of Initial Ideas for Innovations
number of messages proportion
internal to the firm
external to the firm
38
140
21.3%
78.7%
Total 178 100.0%
Table V
Internal Generation of Innovative Ideas by
Foreign-owned and Irish Firms
ownership of firm
proportion of messages generated:
(N = 178)
internally externally
Irish
foreign
18.9%
29.2
81.1%
70.7
1.A2 p» 0.10
Table VI
Sources (external to firm) of Initial Ideas for Innovations
source number of messages proportion (%)
supplier or vendor
domestic 5
foreign 37
firms in same industry
domestic 8
foreign 30
parent firm
domestic 2
foreign 10
private consultant
domestic
foreign 5
trade journal
customer
domestic 1
foreign 6
government department
trade fair
domestic 3
foreign 6
firm in different industry
domestic 3
foreign
government sponsored research
institute (IIRS; AFF; AFT)-
publications other than trade journals
industry association
university
Total
42
38
12
9
7
5
9
4
4
140
30.0%
27.1
8.6
3.6
6.4
5.0
3.6
6.4
2.1
1.4
2.9
2.9
100.0
* Institute of Industrial Research and Standards; An Foras Forbatha;
An Foras Taluntais.
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Considering information coming from outside of the firm (Table VI), several
points should be made. First of all there is the usual discovery that nearly
all of the information is obtained through direct personal contact. About
ten percent of the messages were delivered through documentation (Cf., Allen,
1966; Myers and Marquis, 1969; Langrish, e t al
.
,
1972). Then there is the
degree to which other firms serve as sources of new technology. Seventy-three
percent of the messages came directly from other firms. Fifty-nine percent
came from firms outside Ireland.
Once again, technology is found to flow through informal channels. The
role of documentation is relatively insignificant. But so too are the formal
agencies established to introduce new technology into industry. At the low
frequency end of the spectrum, we see that none of the ideas resulted from
any work in universities either Irish or foreign. Furthermore, the government
sponsored research institutes (Institute of Industrial Research and Standards;
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An Foras Taluntais; and An Foras Forbartha) together account for less than
two percent of the messages. The position of the universities is not surprising,
although this does not make it any the less distressing. The situation with
the research institute is both surprising and distressing. One of the goals
in establishing such institutes is that they produce new concepts and ideas
with a potential for new products and processes in Irish industry.
Far and away the single most important source of new technology for an
Irish firm is another company, usually a foreign one (Table VII). This holds
true even when parent firms are taken as a separate category. Suppliers are
naturally very important in introducing new technology, since much of that
new terhnologv is embodied in new production equipment. Rut even when suppliers
an- il i s rcj^i rdrd t uIIut f 1 niis rnn.uii .is .i m.ijor soiivci' oT in'W 1 cclinu I o^y (Tabic" Vlll)
Q
Responsible for research in support of industry generally; agriculture and
food processing; and physical planning and construction, respectively.
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Table VII
Sources (external to firm) of Initial Ideas for Innovations
source number of messages proportion (%)
Irish firms
foreign firms
parent firms
universities and
research institutes
other
17
73
12
2
36
12.1%
52.1
8.6
1.4
25.7
Total 140 99.9
Table VIII
Suppliers and Other Firms as Sources of Technology
source proportion of messages
supplier firm
other firm
other
30 . 0%
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The most surprising result is that so many of the firms supplying new
technology are apparent competitors. Fully 27 percent of the messages were from
firms in the same industry. It seems surprising that so much information would
be so freely available from apparent competitors. Most of these apparent
competitors, however, are outside of the country, and there is evidence from the
interviews that most of them did not consider themselves to be competitors.
Remember that we are dealing for the most part with fairly small firms, that
lack the highly developed distribution networks required for penetrating foreign
markets. Note too that when the foreign firms are examined, very few of them are
British. The British market is the nearest, geographically, and perhaps the
easiest for an Irish firm to penetrate. So British firms in the same industry
probably see the Irish as competitors and are less willing to share their
technology. Continental European and U.S. firms, on the other hand, are apparently
less threatened by the Irish competition and are therefore much more willing
to share their know-how.
In a typical scenario, an Irish manager might visit a trade show on the
continent, and be invited on a plant visit by representatives of a Danish,
Dutch or German firm. While there he would encounter some new manufacturing
technique, that he would later introduce into his own firm (Cf., the Tumble
Processing of Hams Case, on p. 9).
The willingness on the part of Continental firms may have diminished somewhat
since Ireland's entry into the European Economic Community (Table IX). The data
in Table IX should be interpreted with some care, however. First of all the
difference is far from significant statistically. In addition, the data were
taken from entirely different industries in 1972 and in later years. The only
way to test conclusively for a difference would be to return to the same industries
tli,)t were survevod In 1972. This is ;i distinct possibility, wliich will be
i-nn;; I (If red in futiiri- t"c:u'.i ri'li |> I .mil i iif;.
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Table IX
Sources of Ideas Before and After Ireland's Entry into the
Common Market
idea source proportion of messages
1972 1974, 1975 & 1976
foreign firms in the same industry
other
20.2%
79.8
11.6%
88.4
X = 1.65 p = 0.20
Foreign Ownership
Almost one-fifth (18 percent) of the firms are subsidiaries of foreign
firms. Judging from the data in Table VI, one might conclude that foreign
parent firms were relatively insignificant sources of new technology for their
subsidiaries. Looking only at the foreign-owned firms, however, the picture
is somewhat different. In the case of foreign subsidiaries, 35 percent of
the idea generating messages came from parent firms. This was the principal
source of new technology for this set of firms (Table X)
.
There are some other interesting differences between the Irish and foreign
firms. For example, Irish firms tend to obtain more of their technology from
within their own industry (Table XI). Since most of the firms, from which
they obtain ideas are outside of the country, this is a source which is more
available to domestic firms, than to subsidiaries of multi-nationals. As argued
earlier, the donor firms did not see the Irish as competitors. They presumably
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Table X
Sources (external to the firm) of Innovative Ideas as a Function of Ownership
source proportion of messages
Irish-owned firms foreign subsidiaries
supplier or vendor
domestic 2.7%
foreign 27.9
firms in same industry
domestic 5.4
foreign 24.3
parent firm
domestic 1.8
foreign -
private consultant
domestic
foreign 3.6
trade journal 8.1
customer
domestic 0.9
foreign 5.4
government department 3.6
trade fair
domestic 2.7
foreign 5.4
firm in different industry
domestic
foreign
government sponsored research
institute (IIRS; AFF; AFT)* 1.8
publications other than trade journals 2.7
industry association 3.6
university
6.9%
20.7
6.9
10.3
34.5
3.4
3.4
10.3
3.4
Institute of Industrial Research and Standards; An Foras Forbatha;
•
An Foras Taluntais.
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did see the multi-nationals in that way and were less willing to share ideas
with them. Of course, if EEC entry has closed this source to Irish firms, then
they will lose this advantage. This is an area deserving further study.
Table VI illustrated very clearly the failure of the universities and
research institutes as sources of new technology for industry. Table VI is
based on the entire sample, including both Irish and foreign-owned firms. When
the two are separated, an interesting difference appears. None of the foreign
subsidiaries obtained ideas from universities, research institutes, government
agencies, or industry associations (Table XII). These sources served only
native Irish firms. There is therefore a slight tendency for Irish firms to
substitute for lack of a foreign parent by turning to these bodies. And this
is exactly the function they are supposed to perform. The evidence would indicate
that the reseach institutes are performing this needed function, but not to
the extent necessary. Foreign subsidiaries obtain over one-third of their new
ideas from their parents. Irish firms obtain eight percent of their new ideas
from these "foster parents". There remains a considerable gap between the two.
Inter-Industry Variation
The twelve industries differed in the extent to which they used different
sources for new ideas. Some relied more than others on internally generated
ideas; and some showed greater use of foreign sources (Table XIII). The greatest
variance is in the use of foreign sources.
Inter-industry variation of this sort should not be terribly surprising.
The twelve industries differ greatly in many respects, including their structure,
technological development and degree of foreign ownership.
One might expect technology flow patterns, therefore, to be dependent upon
such industry characteristics. In more specific terms, it can be hypothesized
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Table XII
Comparison of Irish and Foreign Firms in the Extent to Which Ideas
Came from Non-Industrial Irish Research Organizations
Proportion* of Idea-Generating Messages from
Universities, Research Institutes, Government
Departments and Industry Associations
Irish firms 80.0%
Foreign Subsidiaries
Documentary sources excluded in calculating percentage
p = 0.06 (Fisher Exact Probability Test)
that:
1. Firms from industries with a more advanced degree of technological
development (e.g., electrical & electronics; chemicals & pharmaceuticals) will
have a higher proportion, than other industries, of internally generated
ideas. This should result from the fact that firms in such industries normally
have at least a few technically trained personnel on their staff. Such personnel
should be more capable of developing feasible new product ideas or process
modifications.
2. Firms from less technologically developed industries will rely more on
idea sources outside of the firm, and the location (domestic or foreign) of these
sources will be determined by:
a, the strength of the relevant technological infra-structure, as
it exists in Ireland. Where the technological infra-structure is
strong, there will be greater use of domestic sources; where it is
weak, foreign sources will dominate.
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Table XIII
Location of Idea Sources by Industry
industry sources*
within firm domestic contacts foreign contacts
milk products 16.0%
bacon 28.6
other meat 10.0
canning 22.2
chocolate & confectionery 25.0
building materials 23.1
electrical & electronics 58.3
men's and boys' clothing 21.4
chemicals and pharmaceuticals 33.3
machinery manufacture 25.0
cotton and linen textiles 13.3
paper 15.8
28.0%
21.4
33.3
16.7
7.7
28.6
11.1
25.0
26.7
21.1
56.0%
50.0
50.0
44.4
58.3
69.2
41.7
50.0
55.5
50.0
60.0
63.2
* excluding written sources
b. the degree of foreign ownership of firms in the industry. Where
foreign ownership is high, there will be greater use of foreign
technology sources, and vice versa.
Comparing the two high technology industries (electrical & electronics and
chemicals & pharmaceuticals) with the others (Table XIV), we see that the evidence
strongly supports the first hypothesis. Firms in high technology industry are
much more self-reliant in terms of new technology.
Comparing Industries on the basis of domestic technological infra-structure
is ;i bit more difficult. There is evidence, however, that would argue that the
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Table XIV
Location of Technology Sources Used in High Technology
Industries
industry classification sources*
within firm outside of firm
high technology
(electrical & electronics;
chemicals & pharmaceuticals)
other
47.6%
19.4
52.4%
80.6
* excluding documentation
X = 6.69 p = 0.01
Table XV
Location of Technology Sources Used by Firms in the Food Processing Industries
industry classification source*
domestic foreign
food processing
other
28.5%
23.4
71.4%
76.6
* Sources external to the firm, excluding documentation
x^ = 0.209, N.S.
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food processing industries might have a more developed technological base in
Ireland (Herzog, 1975). An Foras Taluntais is the largest of the research in-
stitutes, and a substantial amount of food-related research is pursued both in
that institute and in the universities. The first part of the second hypothesis
was therefore tested by comparing food processing with other industrial sectors,
in terms of the extent they rely on domestic sources of technology (Table XV).
Food processing does not differ from other industries in this regard.
Many of the firms in the sample are subsidiaries of foreign firms. As such,
they might be more inclined toward foreign sources of technology. In fact, there
is little support in the data for this hypothesis either (Table XVI). Irish firms
obtained one-fourth of their idea-messages domestically, but foreign subsidiaries
obtained even more of their information from domestic sources. So there is not
support for the hypothesis that ownership influences the extent to which domestic
technology is used.
Table XVI
Location of Technology Sources Used by Foreign Subsidiaries
source'
domestic foreign
Irish firms
Foreign subsidiaries
25.3%
38.1
74.7%
61.9
sources external to the firm, excluding documentation
7.^ = 0.86, N.S.
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Nature of the Innovation
Out of the 72 innovations, 23 were product innovations, while 48 were
process innovations. This ratio of 1 to 2 in favor of product and component
innovations contrasts with that found in the Myers and Marquis (1969) study
of commercially successful innovations in U.S. industry. The prevalence of
process innovations in the present study is probably due to the nature of the in-
dustries that were studied. The proportion of process innovations varies widely
among industries, ranging from 20 percent in the chocolate and confectionery
industry to 100 percent in chemicals, pharmaceuticals and textiles (Table XVII).
It is tempting at this point to speculate that this might be a result of owner-
ship, with foreign firms being more inclined, toward process improvements for
existing products, and domestic firms searching for new products. The data
clearly do not support this possibility (Table XVIII). In fact, the trend is
in exactly the opposite direction, with a higher proportion of process innovations
by Irish firms.
An alternate explanation stems from the recent work of Abernathy and
Utterback (1975). All of the industries, with the exception of electrical
& electronics and chemicals & pharmaceuticals are relatively mature.
Most of the firms in the sample are in what Abernathy and Utterback (1975)
call a "specific" stage of development. The product has become standardized,
production volume is relatively high and cost has emerged as the primary basis
of competition. Abernathy and Utterback argue that for fairly obvious reasons,
process innovation will dominate in this stage. This is the situation in which
most of the firms were found in all industries, with the possible exception of
the electrical and electronics industry. This along with chocolate and confectionery
are the only industries with a predominance of product innovation. The electrical
.md oloctronics Industry is much closer to what Abernathy and Utterback call the
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Table XVII
Proportion of Process Innovations by Industry
industry
milk products
bacon
other meat
canning
chocolate & confectionery
building materials
electrical & electronics
men's and boys' clothing
chemicals and pharmaceuticals
machinery manufacture
cotton and linen textiles
paper
proportion (percent)
66.7%
87.5
100.0
66.7
20.0
83.3
25.0
66.7
100.0
66.7
100.0
50.0
X = 20.59, p = 0.04
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Table XVIII
Proportion of Process Innovations by Irish and Foreign Firms
proportion of process innovations
Irish firms
Foreign subsidiaries
74.1%
47.4
X = 3.41, p = 0.07
"fluid" stage of development. Here product design is subject to radical change,
product characteristics are in flux and the emphasis of product innovation is
on improved functional performance, rather than cost.
While electrical and electronics can be considered at the "fluid" stage,
in which product innovations predominate, this is probably not true of the
chocolate and confectionery industry. The firms in that Industry would seem to
be in Abernathy and Utterback's "specific" stage. Why then so many product
innovations? This would appear to be an exception to the Abernathy and Utterback
theory. A partial explanation lies in the fact that many of the new product
innovations were critically dependent upon the development of new manufacturing
processes. For example, in the case of one product innovation, a new type of
candy bar, the critical problem to be solved was a process problem. A machine
had to be specially developed to bind the chocolate covering to the nougat interior.
It was the development of this machine, which made the new product possible.
Table XIX
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Sources Used in Solving Problems Associated with the Introduction of
the Innovation
source number of messages
internal to the firm
31
This does not meet the requirements of the "specific" stage, perfectly. It
is really a combination of two innovations, both product and process. But the
process development does not have cost reduction as its principal aim. Neverthe-
less, the evidence might allow the categorization of this industry as somewhere
between the fluid and specific stages.
The net result of all of this, is simply that the high incidence of process
innovation in the sample should not be surprising. At least according to the
Abernathy and Utterback theory, this was determined by the nature of the in-
dustries surveyed. Future analysis will be directed at industries, which the
theory would predict to be more inclined toward product Innovation. This will
provide a more rigorous test to see whether there might be factors in the Irish
situation which make process innovation more likely.
The Problem Solving Phase
After a firm decides to go ahead with a new product or process, it normally
encounters a series of problems which must be solved before implementation is
successfully completed. While many of these problems can be solved by the
staff of the firm, aid is often sought from outside. Nearly two-thirds of all
the problem solving messages originated outside of the firm (Table XIX) . The
most important category outside of the firm is, not surprisingly, the supplier
or vendor. The manufacturer of production equipment is normally bound under
warranty agreement to solve any problems which arise with the use of his equipment.
Private consultants are also engaged frequently at this stage. However,
there is still precious little resort to the research institutes, and even less
to the universities.
While foreign sources are still the most important, domestic sources do
Increase in importance, at this time (Table XX). This is the point at which the
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research institutes might be especially helpful, if a means could be devised
to encourage firms to approach them when they encounter problems in implementing
new technology. Of particular interest, at t is point, is the extent to which
the research institutes are bypassed, in favor of private consultants. Granted
that in some instances, the consultants were paid for by government grants, the
fact remains that the research institutes should be able to fare somewhat better,
than they do, in this competition.
Table XX
Location of Problem Solving Information Sources
proportion of instances used*
idea generation problem solving
within the firm
domestic outside the firm
foreign
documentary
21.3%
23.6
45.8
9.3
37.9%
25.0
35.4
1.7
X = 13.88, p < 0.01
Development of Foreign Contracts
The principals, who were interviewed were generally well acquainted outside
of their country. A substantial majority had actually worked outside of the country
for some portion of their career. The typical Irish manager, in this study, is
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an ardent traveller. We have grown accustomed in recent years to seeing parties
of Japanese businessmen, complete with cameras, in nearly every air terminal
of the world, combing the industrial hinterlands for hints of a profitable tech-
nology. At least insofar as Western Europe is concerned, the Irish need take
second place to no one. The Irish managers, who were interviewed in this study,
were inveterate travellers, taking in at least one foreign trade show per year,
often coupling this trip with a visit to a foreign firm in the industry or to
a supplier of equipment used in the industry.
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
If we take each of the results, in turn, there are a number of lessons
that may be gleaned from these data. First of all, the importance, once again,
of personal contact, in transferring technology.
Comparison with Other Countries
Unfortunately, there are very few studies that have looked at the problem
of the small firm in acquiring technology. There has been an increased interest
in this problem in recent years, however. Ghirardi, e t al
.
(1976) adopted the
research method pioneered in the present study to examine the problem in a sample
of firms in Sao Paulo State, Brazil. Maguire and Kench (1975), using a somewhat
different approach, produced similar results in Australia. The results of these
studies are compared with those of the present study in Table XXI.
There are several points of convergence in the three studies that should be
noted. First of all, the major source of new technology, for firms in all three
countries, is direct contact with other industrial firms. In the Australian
case, there was no distinction reported between domestic and foreign firms as
sources of technology. It is probably safe to assume that, as a result of
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Table XXI
Principal Sources of Technology
source
Ireland
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impact in any of three countries.
Finally there is the role of documentation. In all three countries, it
plays a relatively minor role. Once again we find that technology is seldom
transferred by the printed word. Hopefully, some day the documentalists will
hear this message, and governments will realize that the support of document
storage and dissemination systems will not solve their problems of technological
development.
Personal Contact and Investment in Documentation Systems
The overwhelming dominance of personal contact in technology transfer has
been replicated in study after study, yet it is consistently ignored by policy-
makers (Cf., Cooney & Allen, 1975). If one's goal is to introduce new technology
into Irish industry (or the industry of any other country) , then it should be
obvious by now that documentation retrieval and reprint services will not accom-
plish the goal. More than that, they are not only ineffective but since they
diyert scarce resources from more worthwhile programs, their net contribution is
negatiye.
Of course, one of the reasons for the concentration of effort in documen-
tation services is that they are relatively easy to implement. Promoting effec-
tive personal contact is not quite so easy. Nevertheless, there can be no excuse
for pursuing ineffective programs, because the alternative is difficult. We
must develop policy that effectively utilizes the one proven approach to trans-
ferring technology.
The Role of the Research Institute
The next question that arises, is concerned with the sources of technology
or the direction of technology transfer. At the present time, we observe certain
sources of technology which are utilized and other potential sources which are not
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used at all. This differential usage could be the result of either the perceived
value of the sources or of the ease with which information can be obtained from
them. Allen and Gerstberger 's (1973) research would indicate that is more likely
the latter than the former. One should then not be led to the conclusion that
the technology sources being used are the only ones of any value. There may be
forces inhibiting the use of even more effective sources.
The research institutes are a case in point. They were established to
develop technology that would contribute to the economic development of the
country. Judging from the data, they are of little value to industry as sources
of new technology. The Institute of Industrial Research and Standards deserves
special mention in this respect. Several of the people who were interviewed,
without knowing entirely, the purpose of the study, volunteered their opinion
of the IIRS. These were unanimously negative in their appraisal. The comments,
furthermore dealt both with the substance of IIRS activities, which were deemed,
of low quality and irrelevant to industry needs, and to the inaccessibility of
even this irrelevant information. IIRS has no concept of what the small business-
man needs in terms of technology, that they have no mechanisms for properely
assessing these needs, and that, "whatever they may be doing up there, it couldn't
possibly be of much value."
In at least one instance, the I.I.R.S. was called in for assistance, but in
the words of the manager, who was interviewed, "They just threw up their hands
and said that they didn't understand the problem. They are too far removed from
industrial activity. They just don't understand." The manager eventually
went to a U.S. firm for assistance and was given advice that got him out of the
difficulty.
This may be an isolated case, and it would be wrong to generalize much from
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it, alone. But there were a sufficient number of unsolicited criticisms of
I.I.R.S., that would lead one to believe that there must be some serious difficulty
in its relations with industry.
Now the task of an organization, such as IIRS is an extremely difficult
one. Tt is not able to focus on a single industry or even subset of industries,
rt must be all things to all firms. Were it able to focus on a particular
sogment of industry with a narrow set of technological needs, then there might
lie Homo hope for its meeting those needs. As it is, the task is a liopelcss
one. A point well supported by tlie present data. The organization is not
really aiding industry, and it would hv better abandoned.
But what about a more narrowly focussed organization, such as An Foras
Taluntais? The present data do not show its performance in technology transfer
to be very high, either. That is true. But there is certainly some chance for
improving this performance, so long as An Foras Taluntais' efforts are focussed
on the food processing sector. There is for example, evidence that communication
between An Foras Taluntais and R&D performing firms, in the food industry is
very good.
Figure 1 is adapted from Allen & Cooney (1974), and shows an overall view
of communication patterns between the two principal research institutes as well
as their relations to the universities, on the one hand, and the R&D performing
sector of industry, on the other.
From this perspective, one of the institutes, at least, appears to be per-
forming quite well. An Foras Taluntais has very strong relations with that
segment of the food processing industry, which supports its own internal R&D.
This is seen very clearly in their communication patterns. There is a consistent
and very high level of contact between food scientists in industry and the staff
of this institute.
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LEGEND
Level of Communication Reported
HUH HIGH
MODERATE
LOW
From Allen & Cooney (1973)
FIGURE 1: Communication Between the Research Institutes and Other R&D
Performing Institutions in Ireland.
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In a similar fashion, there is also a very high degree of direct personal
contact between the An Foras Taluntais staff and university research faculties.
Some would argue that this is indicative not of a technology flow from university
to research institute, but rather a flow in the opposite direction. Be that
as it may, there is good communication between university faculties and the
staff of this particular institute, and therefore a high potential for the
transfer of technology in either direction.
How did this come about, and how can one render this compatible with the
results shown in Table VI? Well, first of all, the results in Table VI are
from firms, which support little of no R & D themselves, internally. This makes
them quite different from the firms represented in Figure 1. The Figure 1
firms, since they have their own R&D staffs, can understand and deal directly
with the R&D staff of an institute like An Foras Taluntais. Table VI firms,
on the other hand, have few, if any, technically trained personnel, have great
difficulty understanding the work of a research institute, and an understandable
reluctance to even attempt to communicate with such an institute. There is a
perceived barrier that prevents firms, particularly small backward firms, from
using this potential source of technology.
Now what about an entirely different approach? It would seem that the
approach taken by An Foras Taluntais would almost guarantee the results that have
been observed. By attracting high quality scientists and encouraging publication
and development of a strong scientific base, they might be able to cultivate
relations with the research community, but would almost certainly isolate themselves
from most of Irish industry. So instead of working from a research base, would
it not be more feasible to recruit staff with practical industrial experience,
who were more interested in practical applications of technology than research, and
who could relate directly to their potential clients? These people might not
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themselves be accomplishing technical or scientific breakthroughs, but they would
have the practical experience necessary to solve the sort of low technology
problems encountered by the majority of Irish firms. Then because there should
be some connection to the stream of current technological development, it would
make sense to augment this staff with a very large documentation and technical
liaison staff. This approach certainly makes very good sense and it is exactly
what I.I.R.S. has done. Unfortunately, the data from the present study show very
clearly that it has not worked. After taking a one-third sample of firms in
twelve industries (several of which were suggested to us by the Associate Director
of I.I.R.S. as Industries in which we would find I.I.R.S. involvement), we have
been unable to find a single instance of significant I.I.R.S. involvement in
technology transfer. So the I.I.R.S. strategy, which on the surface appears
eminently reasonable, has not worked. Just why this is so is not immediately
clear. One possibility, suggested by the general manager of a major Irish firm,
is that they have associated themselves too closely with British technology,
and "... British technology is always either too backward or too shophisticated
for Irish purposes." That the I.I.R.S. is connected very strongly to the U.K.
can be documented very readily (Table XXII) . Eighty percent of the foreigners
with whom I.I.R.S. staff reported regular contact were in the U.K.
Furthermore, all of the contacts were European. There were none in the
United States or any other part of the world. So indeed the British connection
is very strong in I.I.R.S. This should not be surprising when one looks at the
way in which the organization is staffed. A very high proportion of the staff
have British backgrounds. They are either themselves British subjects or they
have been educated or worked in Britain.
In addition to the possibility suggested above, that British technology is
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Table XXII
Geographic Location of Foreign Contacts by the Two Research Institutes
region proportion of total foreign contacts by:
r
An Foras Taluntais I.I.R.S.
Great Britain 53.5% 80.0%
Continental Europe 30.6 20.0
United States 9.6
Other 6.3
Data from Allen & Cooney (1973)
is inappropriate to Irish needs, this presents an even more serious problem,
which may explain why the I.I.R.S. strategy has not worked. It may present a
serious cultural barrier to working effectively with Irish managers. It may,
in fact, even deter I.I.R.S. consultants from cultivating the sort of intimate
contact with industrial clients, which is essential to the successful performance
of their mission.
The second part of the I.I.R.S. strategy, that is, the emphasis on documen-
tation is even more likely to be doomed to failure. If there is any clear
message that has come out of the Brazilian, Australian and present studies,
couplod with numerous other investigations in the United States and Europe, it
is tint liTliii()l());y Is sflilom transferrod by thi' printed word. Despite all of
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this evidence, I.I.R.S. has consistently concentrated a major portion of their
effort in this area. Judging from our results, this effort has been totally
wasted. Fewer than ten percent of the messages were delivered via documentation.
And none of these documents were obtained through I.I.R.S.
So, as logical as the I.I.R.S. approach may seem, its implementation has
been less than a smashing success.
Let us now return to the An Foras Taluntais strategy. Criticism is often
heard of the tendency of An Foras Taluntais personnel to be too concerned with
"basic" resea,rch and publication. Naturally people are going to work on problems
that lead to publications and publications only, if these are the only kinds of
problems that come to their attention. But if they are presented with problems
of a practical nature and encouraged by the reward system to pursue these, there
is no reason why they won't find these problems just as appealing.
If an institute is staffed with people whose orientation is too basic, it
is at least possible to move them in the direction of increased concern over appli-
cation. If, on the other hand, an institute is staffed with people of relatively
Iqw technical competence, its initial reputation makes it extremely difficult
to attract good staff, or to increase its reputation in the eyes of the R&D
community. It is a one-way street. An Foras Taluntais is moving in the accepted
direction. I.I.R.S. is attempting to go the other way.
We would not argue that even movement in the right direction will come about
automatically or even easily. It will require a marked change in outlook on the
part of the researcher. In some instances this will be impossible or unacceptable.
We would argue that these cases are rare and that in most cases the institute
scientist is most concerned with working on interesting and important problems.
Our main point is that there are problems in industry, which are both scientifically
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interesting and important, but that the scientist must be brought into direct
contact with them before he can become aware of this simple fact.
One way of initiating such a process would consist of having teams of
R&D personnel visit a sample of firms periodically, preferably just prior to
project review and budgeting time. This team would be knowledgable in the
technologies, underlying the firms' activities and would seek out problems
and areas which might be improved by systematic research or development effort.
A case in point: at the time of the first interviews, no one really under-
stood why the process of tumbling hams together for a period of time results
in protein migration and increased yield. This appears to be a reasonably
fundamental research problem with very definite practical benefits. There are
no doubt a very large number of such problems, begging to be undertaken. A
research institute must actively seek out such problems. A first step would
he the Huggested formation of technically competent teams of individuals Pre
potentially relevant disciplines to go on site inspections of firms in spe-
cified industries. The team's goal would be not to help specific individual
firms, but rather to search out general problem areas where the applications
of their research might benefit an industry. The experience of catologuing
areas for potential improvement of either production processes or products
will prove invaluable in directing and selecting research projects later on.
That is why it is strongly suggested that such tours be tied to the project
selection and budgeting cycle.
The Pellucio Plan
roni
Another possible incentive to interaction between industry and both universities
and government research institutes would be to funnel at least part of the
government's funding of the universities and research institutes, through industry.
This concept is now being implemented in Brazil. It was first proposed by
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Jose Pellucio, who is Director of Fiaanciadora de Estudos e Projetos, the agency
responsible for funding most of the Brazilian institutes. Industrial firms would
be provided budgets, or vouchers, that can only be spent to support research
in a research institute or university. The firm itself, however, has complete
authority within these limits over selection of both project and source, and may
even choose not to spend the money, at all.
Such a scheme would motivate industry to be more directly concerned with
the activities of the institute or university department. Most research in-
stitutes have boards or steering committees to oversee their activities now.
Such boards are often little more than "rubber stamp" affairs. They have
neither the time nor the inclination to delve very deeply into an institute's
activities.
If they were spending money (even someone else's money) in an institute,
they would be much more careful in monitoring the activities of that institute,
and in seeing how the money was spent.
For their part, institute personnel will quickly seek out customer interests
once the fact becomes clear that the customer had money to spend on research.
Twenty years in one or another type of R&l) organization has convinced the author
tliat researchers arc eminently capable of discovering a customer's needs once
it becomes clear that the customer Ims money to spend. That is not to say tlial
they will completely re-orient their work. They will adapt, and try to convince
the customer that his needs will be mot, if they pursue their interests. The
customer can allow himself to be convinced or seek his help elsewhere. Through
this negotiation process, both user needs and supplier capabilities become more
fully explicated and understood by both sides. The work of the institute cannot
help but become more relevant and more widely used by industry.
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Ireland, firms could be asked to contribute something to offset the cost of
the program. The M.I.T. program is now experimenting with a new mechanism
to stimulate faculty interest in cooperation. Faculty are allotted points
for different forms of cooperation: two points for entertaining an industrial
visitor for an hour in the faculty member's office; six points for participat-
ing in a symposium for industry; eight points for a plant visit; and so on.
Ten percent of the income from the program is then distributed to tho fnrully
in proportion to their point totals for the year. This money is not taken
in the form of income, but can be used to supplement other funds for the pro-
curement of computer time, purchase of needed instrumentation, or support of
research staff. The plan has been in operation for two years and faculty
response has been very strong. The total number of points accrued by the faculty
(a measure of involvement) increased by 32% from the first to the second year
of the program. In addition to the overall increase in activity, there was an
increase in the number of participating faculty, as well. University faculty
can determine as well as anyone, which side of the bread carries the butter.
They behave accordingly. A program of this sort can serve as a two-way stimulus.
It not only provides an incentive for faculty to see that the results of their
work reach potential users; it opens a channel through which the university
researcher can be influenced, in his selection of research problems. This
is not to say that he sacrifices any of his freedom, in this regard. Rather,
he is now provided with more information, and should be able to make a better
decision, whether it is in accord with industry's current desires, or not.
Foreign Ownership
Since so many of the firms in Ireland are subsidiaries of foreign firms,
it is interesting to note the different patterns that have developed for foreign
and domestically owned firms. Foreign firms are overwhelmingly the captive of
their parent. Parent firms are heavy providers of technology. That this
A6
technology is biased in terms of the overall corporate plan is a foregone
conclusion. While this is not necessarily bad, it can stifle creativity
in the subsidiary, and prove extremely frustrating to the more inventive
or entrepreneurial managers, in the subsidiary. There is among the cases,
at least one local project, which was strongly discouraged by a foreign parent
firm. There were also some stories volunteered of "very promising" projects
which had been quashed, because they did not fit well in the overall business
plan of the multinational. This can be extremely frustrating for local mana-
gers and can stifle projects of potential value to the country.
Nevertheless, there is no denying the evidence that parent firms eerve
as a rich source of technology for their subsidiaries, and may have a generally
positive effect on domestic technological development. Furthermore, since there
is some turnover of personnel between firms, there is a potential for transfer
beyond the subsidiary, and some evidence that this is indeed happening. This
is a topic worthy of further investigation.
The domestic firm, being denied access to foreign technology through a
foreign parent, has effectively substituted for this by direct contact with firms
outside of the country. This is an avenue denied to the foreign firm by com-
petition. The potential closing of this channel to the domestic firm is a
situation that deserves close attention. There is some evidence, although
still relatively inconclusive, that this is happening. Future research must
be addressed to this possibility.
As continental European firms come to perceive the Irish as direct compr-
titors, they will become less willing to share their technology. Attempts
should be made to increase the amount of informal contact between Irish firms
and firms in America and Japan. This would compensate for the loss of European
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contact
.
Domestic Technology
In Che technologically more advanced industries (chemicals, electronics,
etc.), we find a significantly higher proportion of internally generated ideas.
There is also a slight, but non-significant, tendency for firms in these in-
dustries to be less reliant on foreign technology. There is no evidence that
tlie firms in these industries are being aided at all by the technological
infra-structure of the country. They are not helped by the research instituies
and universities any more than firms in other industries. One might suspect
that, since these firms have developed, on their own, a slightly higher degree
of technological sophistication, that they might find some basis for greater
interaction with the research institutes and universities. The data indicate
very clearly, that this has not happened. This is equally i rue for hoi li Irish
.md foreign-owned firms.
Ireland has, in certain areas, developed a reasonably sound t cchno I op,i ca I
base in its universities and research institutes (cf. Herzog, 1975). Unfor-
tunately this system operates largely independent of the industries, which it
could potentially support.
This is a situation that is certainly not unique to Ireland. Most small
countries have attempted to aid the technological development of their industry
through support of research in universities and research institutes. What
evidence there is, on the effectiveness of these measures (cf. Utterback, I97S)
would indicate that this strategy has generally failed. The universities and
research institutes may develop a very high degree of technological competence,
but this is seldom successfully utilized by industry. Drastic measures are
called for, to stimulate such utilization. Unless the situation can be radi-
cally improved, there can be no justification for government support of such
a system.
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